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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-4239
___________
PHILIP JOHNSON,
                                                                            Appellant
   v.
THE CITY OF NEW YORK; THE CITY OF
NEW YORK ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN'S
SERVICES; ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN'S
SERVICES CASEWORKERS; JANE DOES A.K.A.
KAGAN, POLLACK AND PIERRE-LOUIS; THE
CITY OF NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 07-cv-01853)
District Judge:  Honorable Faith S. Hochberg
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 1, 2009
Before: BARRY, SMITH and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed October 5, 2009)
___________
OPINION
___________
     The doctrine derived from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and1
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 
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PER CURIAM
Philip Johnson sued the City of New York, agencies of the City of New York,
including the New York Administration for Children’s Services (“ACS”), and ACS case
workers.  He brought claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 1986, alleging that
the defendants violated his rights when ACS conducted emergency removals of his
children from his home in June 2002 and March 2004 based on allegations of abuse and
neglect.  
Some of the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing, inter alia,
that the complaint was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and Rooker-Feldman.  1
After reviewing Johnson’s complaint against the previous actions he filed in federal court
in New York (Johnson v. Queens Admin. for Children’s Servs., No. 02-cv-04497, 2006
WL 229905 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2006) (“Johnson I”) and Johnson v. New York, No. 04-
cv-01070, 2007 WL 764514 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2007) (“Johnson II”), the District Court
dismissed the complaint against all the defendants on res judicata grounds.  See Day v.
Moscow, 955 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that a res judicata defense may be
raised in a motion to dismiss when the defense is apparent on review of court records of
which a court can take notice).  The District Court also concluded that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine barred review to the extent that Johnson challenged issues already
3adjudicated in state court.  Johnson appeals.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review
over the District Court’s decision.  See Venuto v. Witco Corp., 117 F.3d 754, 758 & n.5
(3d Cir. 1997) (“Our review of the district court’s application of res judicata rules . . . is
plenary.”); Turner v. Crawford Square Apts. III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006)
(“Our review of the district court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is
plenary.”)
On review, we conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Johnson’s
complaint.  To determine the preclusive effects of a prior judgment, we look to the law of
the issuing court.  See Paramount Aviation Corp. v. Agusta, 178 F.3d 132, 145 (3d Cir.
1999).  The issuing courts were federal courts (sitting within the Second Circuit), where,
to prevail on the defense of res judicata, a litigant must show “that 1) the previous action
involved an adjudication on the merits; 2) the previous action involved the plaintiffs or
those in privity with them; [and] 3) the claims asserted in the subsequent action were, or
could have been, raised in the prior action.”  Monahan v. New York City Dep’t of Corr.,
214 F.3d 275, 285 (2d Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Athlone Industries, Inc., 746
F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir. 1984).  In this case, the defendants satisfied their burden.
Johnson raised claims relating to the emergency removal of the children in June
2002 in Johnson I.  The claims were adjudicated on the merits, with the district court
granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants.  In Johnson II, Johnson litigated
claims relating to the emergency removal of his children in March 2004.  The district
court, granting summary judgment in that case, adjudicated those claims on the merits. 
As the District Court concluded in this case, the claims Johnson raises in his complaint in
this action were or could have been raised in his earlier lawsuits.  Accordingly, they are
barred by the doctrine of res judicata.  
Furthermore, as the District Court determined, to the extent that Johnson actually
seeks review of decisions rendered by the Queens County Family Court, the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine bars review.  See Turner, 449 F.3d at 547 (discussing the contours of
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).    
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s decision.  
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